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Abstract 
This article explores adjustments to the traditional political risk management practices followed by 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in their international operations to incorporate an increasingly 
concerning risk arising from the more frequent imposition of economic sanctions on developing 
countries over the last ten years for political purposes. In order to identify the main determinants of 
this risk and its consequences, a literature review is conducted, highlighting the models proposed by 
Tsebelis (1990) and Kakutami (2017) as the main frameworks to understand the dynamics for 
sanctions impositions, their frequency and the management of this risk by traditional MNCs from 
developed countries. Kakutami’s model is further enhanced in this article with a game theoretical 
model to understand the dynamic behavior of MNCs under this context, considering evidences of a 
growing presence in international markets of MNCs from developing countries, whose motivations for 
their expansion are explored. Finally, different political risk mitigating strategies are reviewed to 
explore their suitability to MNCs, with particular emphasis on the use of insurance to cover this risk 
and its effects on MNCs’ willingness to engage with sanctioned countries. As a general finding, from a 
reputational point of view, MNCs should take a more active role in their network analysis to identify 
their direct and indirect exposure to this risk, given the more frequent imposition of sanctions with an 
extraterritorial reach. 
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Introduction 
The study of the political risk management practices by Multinational Corporations (MNCs), 
mostly from developed countries, in their dealings with developing countries1 has been 
mainly focused on risks arising from these countries, especially due to actions taken by their 
own States and other local actors, such as expropriations, local regulations, etc. Little 
attention has been placed by the academic literature on political risks related to those 
countries but arising from abroad (Brink 2004; Gregory 1988). Among the latter group of 
risks, MNCs’ trade and investment relations with developing countries have been recently 
challenged by the more frequent imposition of international economic sanctions with an 
extraterritorial reach by foreign governments and other international entities (senders) for 
political purposes on a growing number of governments of non-developed countries (targets)2 
over the last ten years. This is a growing area of concern for MNCs as reflected in recent 
surveys, such as the annual Political Risk Survey Reports published by Oxford Analytica and 
Willis Towers Watson, which places country sanctions as one of their top three political risks 
in 2019, ahead of other traditionally researched political risks.  
Giving this evidence, this article is aimed at establishing an integrated framework, based on 
the review of the existing literature on country economic sanctions and their modelling, which 
                                                          
1 Countries are classified from developed to developing countries according to their income per capita and other 
measures related to their inhabitants’ life quality summarized in the Human Development Index (HDI), with 
developed countries reporting the highest values in those dimensions. Developed countries report HDIs above 
0.8 (in a range from 0 to 1) and high income per capita, set above USD 12,376 according to the World Bank 
(2018). All other countries are deemed as developing countries (International Monetary Fund 2015) ranging 
from emerging market countries (displacing traditional activities from the agriculture and raw materials exports 
to more technologically advanced activities) to least developed countries (with mostly traditional economic 
activities, constraints for their sustainable economic growth and income per capita below USD 1,025 in 2018 as 
per the World Bank). 
2 In the academic literature, the sanctioning and the sanctioned parties are respectively known as “the sender” 
and “the target” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). 
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can be used by MNCs to face this emerging risk concern before and after their imposition 
(Kakutami 2017; Tsebelis 1990).  
The setting of this integrated framework for MNCs will also consider its relevance to the 
specific characteristics of MNCs from developed and developing countries. From this 
perspective, the traditional literature on MNCs has described them as entities from capital 
exporting developed countries that display converging political, economic, legal, 
environmental and social systems, posing little risk for MNCs entering into these markets.  
On the other hand, within the context of developing countries, a new group of MNCs is 
arising from emerging market countries over the last 30 years through the process of 
economic globalization, procuring their international expansion with more flexible 
approaches that differ from those applied by MNCs from developed countries. Those 
distinctive approaches to deal with target countries will be also reviewed to identify their 
motivations.  
In order to understand the MNCs’ behavior risking likely penalties by senders due to their 
dealings with targets, the original static model proposed by Kakutami (2017) to explain this 
behavior will be further adjusted through a game theoretical approach to explain the dynamics 
of the interactions between MNCs and senders. 
The practical implementation of these strategic moves by MNCs will also involve the review 
of different tactics to mitigate their expected loss impact through their retention, avoidance or 
transfer of this risk. These tactics will be analyzed to discuss their relative usefulness for 
MNCs in the management of their operations with targets from developing countries, with 
particular attention to understand the effects of the use of insurance to cover this risk on the 
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behavior of insured MNCs based on an extension to the game theoretical model proposed by 
Tsebelis (1990). 
Economic sanctions: characteristics and effects 
Economic sanctions have been used by international organizations such as the United Nations 
and different sovereign states to obtain desirable political and humanitarian changes in their 
sanctioned targets. Those targets are generally sovereign states and can also include 
companies, non-profit organizations, groups (such as terrorists, drug dealers, cybercriminals 
and the alike) and individuals. The most frequent goal to impose these sanctions over the 
period 1914-2000 (Hufbauer et al. 2007) corresponded to political regime changes and 
subsequent democratization, representing 39.22% of cases, especially against regimes that 
maintained a hostile stance toward the sender. Other frequent goals were aimed at causing 
modest policy changes (21.08%) that do not represent a change of the target’s government, 
other major policy changes (16.18%), military impairment to prevent a potential powerful 
hostile regime (14.22%) and disruption of military adventures undertaken by the target 
(9.31%). 
In general, the imposition of sanctions for political aims can take different types, namely: 
a. Trade sanctions: measures to limit trade relationships with the target, especially to reduce 
its exports to the sender or to the rest of the world through the imposition of trade quotas, 
higher tariffs, import licenses in the sender’s country as well as to limit the sender’s 
exports to the target. 
b. Financial sanctions: comprising the seizure of the target’s assets abroad as well as 
restrictions on investment and financial transactions with the target such as mandatory 
disinvestment, suspension or restrictions on lending and payments related to the target, etc. 
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c. Targeted sanctions: such as travel, transportation and communications bans. 
d. Embargoes: aimed at prohibiting all kind of dealings with the target. 
Hufbauer et al. (2007) found a success rate of 34% for imposed country sanctions for political 
reasons during the period 1914-1990. Morgan et al. (2009) enhanced the research on 
sanctions’ success by including sanctions threats in 888 cases of sanctions threats and 
impositions during the period 1971-2000 finding a success rate of 35% for imposed sanctions 
and 45% for sanctions threats that were not finally imposed. 
It is important to distinguish these kinds of sanctions for political aims from sanctions that 
emerge due to international trade breaches as well as from new sanctions proposals based on 
violation to environmental issues according to the 2016 Paris Climate Agreement.3 These 
violations are dealt with economic countermeasures by the sanctioning party, mainly 
imposing compensating trade barriers, rising import duties, etc., until the sanctioned party 
changes its unfair trade practices, without procuring any political change from its part 
(Stanglin 2010).4 Some of these trade countermeasures can be avoided by MNCs from the 
target by setting local operations as subsidiaries in the sanctioning country to supply its 
market and to circumvent these higher import duties. This strategy is totally unpractical in a 
context of economic sanctions for political / humanitarian purposes as these consider that any 
kind of trade or investment deal with the target is illegal with an extraterritorial reach beyond 
the sender’s jurisdiction. The dynamic interaction between sender and target countries before 
any sanction enforcement has been described under game theoretical frameworks by authors 
                                                          
3 Colman, Zack. 2019. “Europe threatens U.S. with carbon tariffs to combat climate change.” Politico.com, 
December 13. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2019/12/13/europe-carbon-tariff-
climate-change-084892. 
4 Stanglin, Doug.2010. “Brazil slaps trade sanctions on the U.S. to retaliate for subsidies to cotton farmers.” USA 
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such as Tsebelis (1990) with further refinements by Pradiptyo (2007). The use of game 
theoretical models is considered as suitable to describe this risk as it involves different 
strategic actions and reactions between its players, yielding different outcomes. Tsebelis 
(1990), considered a 2x2 game between a sender country and a target country. The target 
country follows two strategies: to violate the international law or to comply with it; whereas 
the sender country can choose two strategies: to enforce and not to enforce sanctions on the 
target. Under this game, no player follows a particular strategy with probability equal to one. 
Assuming complete information, rationality, continuous choices and simultaneous moves, 
Tsebelis determines the probabilities for the target’s compliance (x) and for the enforcement 
of sanctions by the sender (y), from the following matrix in Table 1: 




  Sanction No sanction 
Target Violate a1+e1x; a2+e2y b1+e1x; b2 
 
Comply c1; c2+e2y d1; d2 
Source: Tsebelis (1990). 
The terms a1, b1, c1 and d1 represent the average payoffs to the target under different scenarios 
adjusted by the asymmetric information correction factor e1 (if the payoffs to the target are 
unknown to the sender) whereas a2, b2, c2 and d2 are the payoffs to the sender adjusted by the 
asymmetric information correction factor e2 (if the payoffs to the sender are unkown to the 
target). In equilibrium, the probabilities x* and y* are obtained as follows: 
Optimal target’s compliance probability (x*): 
x* = (d2 - c2 - e2y) / (d2 - c2 -e2y + a2 +e2y - b2)  (I) 
Optimal sender’s sanctions imposition probability (y*): 
y* = (b1 + e1x - d1) / (bl + e1x - dl + cl - al - e1x)  (II) 
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When the terms e1 and e2 are equal to 0, then, both players are playing under conditions of 
complete information, rationality, continuous choices, and simultaneous moves. If one of 
these players chooses a strategy different to x* and y*, the other party has incentive to change 
his strategy, keeping simultaneous actions and counteractions between the parties. According 
to these results, the sender country is unable to affect the target country’s compliance 
probability (x*) by influencing the target’s payoffs under the different scenarios described in 
Table 1. On the other hand, the probability expressed in (II) should be taken into account to 
determine the expected loss for an MNC due to sanctions impositions on its dealings with a 
target country. This loss probability depends on the perceived payoffs to the target (violator) 
country under different scenarios.  
New MNCs players in sanctioned countries: the increasing presence of Emerging 
Markets MNCs (EMNCs) 
The growth of different emerging market countries over the last 30 years has favored the 
transformation of their local corporations into large MNCs, best known as Emerging Market 
Multinationals (EMNCs). The increasing presence of these EMNCs is reflected in the Fortune 
Global 500 list of firms according to their revenues in 2015 where 30% of these firms are 
EMNCs versus 10% ten years ago. By 2019, EMNCs from China have a leading 
representation in this list, with 119 companies, followed by corporates from Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Mexico and Russia among other seven emerging market countries 
(Mourdoukoutas 2019).  
These EMNCs tend to invest in regional markets with some kind of cultural affinity with the 
EMNCs’ countries of origin, with fewer concerns for political risks and place more 
importance on their revenues growth in their current overseas expansion phase rather than on 
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their profit margins, which is the focus for MNCs from developed countries (Gomez-Mera et 
al. 2014). At the same time, the internationalization of EMNCs from 20 top emerging market 
countries has contributed to 20% of the current global outward investment flows in 2015 in 
comparison to 2% at the end of the twentieth century (Casanova and Miroux 2016). Many 
leading EMNCs are characterized by a relatively higher labor intensity in their production 
techniques as it is the most abundant production factor (rather than capital) in their countries 
of origin. The use of labor intensive techniques leads EMNCs to procure their entry into 
foreign markets with high levels of labor supply to be used in combination with their 
technologies (Tolentino 2012). Their entry into targets with high labor intensity contributes 
with the target’s efforts to achieve autarky conditions for their local supply of goods and 
services. 
These EMNCs have mainly addressed their international expansion by using innovative and 
eclectic business models, which are suitable to the unstable economic and political conditions 
of developing countries as these corporates are used to similar problems in their countries of 
origin. This practice makes them comfortable to engage in less transparent business  practices 
aimed at obtaining benefits from local authorities in their countries of operations, as 
denounced by Transparency International (2016).  
At the same time, EMNCs can leverage their presence in new markets by recurring to mergers 
and acquisitions (M&A) of local companies to obtain faster access to local know-how and 
social capital (networking) with connections to key political entities that can grant them with 
privileges for their local operations. By contrast, MNCs from developed countries place their 
competitive advantages on the possession of key resources or in their leading positioning 
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within their economic sectors, with more concern for their reputational risk (Madhok and 
Marques 2013). 
In particular, EMNCs operating in regulated sectors such as utilities, etc., are more willing to 
engage in political negotiations with sanctioned targets as described by Garcia-Canal and 
Guillen (2008), who mention the entry experiences in Latin America of Spanish companies 
from regulated sectors in the period 1987-2000. These companies have been more inclined to 
invest in more politically unstable countries if their authorities have more discretionary 
decision-making processes to grant favorable entry conditions to these companies that 
otherwise should undergo relatively stricter entry conditions than the non-regulated ones if 
they attempt to enter into more stable developed countries with more regulated grating 
processes by their authorities. 
On the other hand, many top EMNCs in the previous 2019 Fortune Global 500 list are State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), such as Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum and State Grid 
from China, Gazprom and Rosneft from Russia, which is a condition that makes more 
difficult their international expansion through M&A abroad. This restriction is due to the 
perception that SOEs from countries such as China have received subsidies to acquire targets 
abroad, which is considered as an unfair advantage under current international trade and 
investment standards. This practice led to reforms in the United States (US) and the European 
Union (EU) to control Foreign Direct Investment through changes to the Committee on 
Foreign Investment in the United States (CIFIUS) and the enactment of the EU framework for 
screening Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2019 under the Regulation 2019/452 of the 
European Parliament. The EU framework for screening FDI has similar objectives as the 
CIFIUS (Adesnik and Ghasseminejad 2018). 
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These restrictions in developed countries for SOEs from emerging countries have encouraged 
them to procure other counties for their investments and trade flows (Business and Sanctions 
Consulting The Netherlands 2019). As the number of sanctioned countries has recently 
increased, it is important to consider the economic weight of those sanctioned allied countries 
in relation to the economic weight of their senders to assess the success rate and likely 
duration of these sanctions, which should be taken into account by MNCs to decide whether 
to leave, enter or delay their entry into a sanctioned country. This new pattern of alliances 
should be also incorporated into empirical studies to assess its impact on sanctions duration 
and success rates, which have been previously focused on the comparison between the GNPs 
of a single target and its senders. 
Modeling MNCs’ dynamic behavior to deal with country economic sanctions risk 
Based on the framework proposed by Kakutami (2017) and as a contribution to further 
understand the dynamic behavior of MNCs under country economic sanctions, this 
framework will be analyzed by analogy to the auditing games originally proposed by 
Rasmusen (2001) between tax authorities and taxpayers. The adjustment of these games to 
this political risk involves considering MNCs and senders as players sharing similarities with 
the behavioral patterns of taxpayers and tax authorities, respectively. 
Under the sanctions game, an MNC evaluates two decisions: sanctions-bursting (SB) and 
sanctions compliance (SC). The sender considers two levels of observance on an MNC’s 
sanctions compliance: high and low observance, which determines two levels of conspicuity 
detection for an MNC: high conspicuity (HC) and low conspicuity (LC). 
An MNC faces a fine (F) if detected in SB and makes a decision to engage in this activity 
with a probability equal to α. In parallel, the sender runs observance activities on an MNC, 
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which determines a HC with probability β. At the same time, an MNC can obtain a payoff 
equal to P if engaged in sanction-bursting without being detected and P-F if detected whereas 
its payoff is expected to be equal to U as sanctions-compliant. It is assumed that P>U. 
On the other hand, the sender enacts a legal framework as well as promotes compliance 
campaigns with a total cost of S, such as S>0 to achieve a probability β to detect, to expose 
and to penalize sanctions-bursting activities by an MNC. The sender expects to obtain an 
economic payoff 5 equal to A if an MNC is sanctions-compliant and a net economic benefit of 
A – S after deducting its enforcement and campaigning costs. The sender sets a fine (F) at a 
level high enough to prevent sanctions-bursting so that F>P. The sender can obtain, at least, 
an economic payoff of E from an MNC if the sender follows a LC detection policy. For 
simplicity, it is assumed that S=0 under the latter policy. 
Considering the previous scenarios, the net benefits for both parties can be expressed as a 2-
by-2 simultaneous-move game stated in Table 2 by analogy to the Rasmusen’s auditing 
games: 
Table 2. Sanctions-bursting game by an MNC in a target country 
  MNC 
Sender 
 SB(α) SC(1-α) 
HC (β) (A-S, P-F) (A-S, U) 
LC (1-β) (E,P) (A, U) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration. 
The game in Table 2 is a discoordination game with mixed rather than pure strategies for its 
equilibrium. The equilibrium can be obtained by equating the strategies followed by each 
player: 
                                                          
5 If MNCs act in compliance with sanctions then economic sanctions are expected to last shorter until 
obtaining the desirable results aimed by the sender, increasing future expected returns to the sender (through 
tax and tariffs revenues, etc) from normal dealings of MNCs with previously sanctioned targets. 
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a. For the MNC: their profits under sanctions-bursting (πSB) and under sanctions-
compliance (πSC) are expressed as follows:  
Expected sanctions-bursting profits: 
E(πSB) = (P-F)β + P(1- β)  (III) 
Expected sanctions-compliance profits: 
E(πSC) = U    (IV) 
Then, (III) and (IV) are equated to achieve the optimal situation for an MNC facing both 
scenarios in expression (V), so it can be indifferent between them: 
E(πSB) = E(πSC)   (V) 
By replacing (III) and (IV) in (V), the following re-expression for (V) can be obtained in (VI): 
(P-F)β + P(1- β) = U   (VI) 
Expression (VI) can be rearranged to obtain an expression for the determinants of β, as the 
optimal conspicuity detection probability β* in (VII), which should make an MNCs 
indifferent between sanctions-bursting and sanctions-compliance: 
β*   = (P- U)/F   (VII) 
b. For the sender: its profits under high-conspicuity detection (πHC) and low-conspicuity 
detection (πLC) policies are stated in (VIII) and (IX): 
Expected profits from a high-conspicuity detection policy: 
πHC = A – S    (VIII) 
Expected profits from a low-conspicuity detection policy: 
πLC = Eα + A (1- α)   (IX) 
Then, expressions (VIII) and (IX) are equated in (X) to express an indifferent scenario for the 
sender between both detection policies: 
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πHC = πLC    (X) 
Expression (X) is re-expressed by replacing both sides by (VIII) and (IX) to obtain (XI): 
A – S = Eα + A(1-α)   (XI) 
Expression (XI) is rearranged to obtain a function for the determinants of the optimal 
probability, α*, of sanctions-bursting by an MNC, yielding: 
α* = S/(A-E)     (XII) 
As expressed in (XII), the optimal strategy to be followed by an MNC is related to the level S 
of compliance-detection costs for the sender. A lower level of S to achieve a given probability 
β of conspicuity detection, leads to a lower sanction-bursting probability α by an MNC, since 
it will be cheaper to detect its sanctions bursting activities.  
In order to ensure this equilibrium, the sender should focus its auditing efforts on a consistent 
proportion of MNCs that had been engaged with the target before imposing sanctions. This 
proportion should be also consistent with the track record that the sender keeps in its 
sanctions-detection efforts. If an MNC is aware that a sender is focused on auditing a 
proportion of MNCs lower than β*, such as β = 0, then the MNC is likelier to engage in 
sanctions-bursting with probability α = 1 considering that P > U, namely, its payoff under 
sanctions-bursting practices (P) will be higher that its payoff following sanctions-compliance 
practices (U). If a sender knows this reaction by the MNC, then the sender will pursue a 
higher level of β, such as β = 1, which is also known by the MNC and will procure not to 
engage in sanctions bursting with α = 0. But the latter reaction is also known by the sender 
that will procure a lower β and the MNC will react to it with α = 1. These reactions will be 
repeated successively without achieving an equilibrium. 
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Within this dynamic between senders and targets, MNCs might attempt to consider different 
strategic approaches to mitigate the effects of these sanctions on their operations, which will 
be reviewed in the next section. 
MNCs’ risk management tactics under country economic sanctions for political aims 
In the management of political risks, MNCs follow different strategies to reduce their 
potential losses as well as the occurrence probabilities. Those strategies traditionally 
correspond to the following approaches (Brink 2004; Gregory 1988): a) Integrative strategies, 
and b) Protective -defensive strategies. 
Integrative strategies are focused on mitigating the potential adverse impact of political risk 
factors on corporates by reducing their likelihood. This is mostly achieved by lobbying 
practices with host governments where MNCs operate and integrating their practices to the 
local market conditions and regulations to reduce the frequency of local hostilities towards 
companies that, otherwise, may be perceived as foreigners or allied to national enemies. 
On the other hand, the use of protective-defensive strategies is oriented to minimize the 
magnitude of total losses arising out of political events in the host country such as 
expropriations, confiscations, foreign exchange controls, etc. These strategies procure to 
reduce their aggregated losses through the diversification of MNCs’ functional areas and 
supply chains across different jurisdictions worldwide. 
The main concern to choose among those strategies has been traditionally centered around 
risks emerging from governments in the host countries where MNCs operate. Especially, after 
an expropriation or confiscation of MNCs’ operations, MNCs may lose their control on the 
local production of key goods or services for their supply chains. As alternative to obtain their 
needed supplies, MNCs can follow trading with those operations under new owners. 
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However, these transactions are likely to be banned under the current context of economic 
sanctions on a growing number of target governments in countries where those operations are 
based, which may produce a significant collapse to MNCs’ global activities. This concern for 
MNCs is reflected in Table 3, which reports the top political risks for their operations based 
on a survey by Oxford Analytica and Willis Towers Watson in 2019 among top MNCs: 
Table 3. Main political risk concern in 2019 for MNCs 
Risk % of total responses 
Trade sanctions or import/export embargo 31 
Political violence or forced abandonment 22 
Currency transfer restrictions or inconvertibility 17 
Expropriation or creepy expropriation 14 
Sovereign non-payment 9 
Others 7 
Source: Oxford Analytica and Willis Towers Watson (2019) 
The previous survey was conducted in a group of MNCs across different industries from 
developed countries (the US, Europe and Japan), mostly at the top 500 Fortune companies 
according to their revenues, obtaining responses from 41 of these companies. In this group, 
61% of the firms affirm that their levels of political risk have increased since 2018, mainly 
due to the imposition of economic sanctions on countries such as Iran, Russia and Venezuela. 
Trade sanctions is at the top of this list, displacing other risks that have been traditionally 
rated as more concerning, such as expropriation and currency inconvertibility (Oxford 
Analytica and Willis Towers Watson 2017). 
In all cases, MNCs procure to avoid the use of direct financial transactions using conventional 
international institutions as the existing bureaucracy responsible for the supervision of 
sanctions compliance can track them more easily though financial institutions. This 
bureaucracy is highly specialized in the United States and in the European Union (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer 2017). 
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In the United States, the Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issues the Specially 
Designated Nationals and Blocked Person List (SDN List) containing the names of persons 
and entities that are banned from engaging in business deals with US nationals. In relation to 
the European Union, its sanctions are implemented as follows: a) in compliance with 
Resolutions by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Chapter, b) according 
to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under Article 29 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and implemented at EU or national levels in 
conformity with CFSP Council Decisions whenever those involve arms embargoes or 
admission restrictions. The responsibility to impose penalties for sanctions breaches 
corresponds to EU Member States rather than to EU Institutions. It also involves the issuance 
of lists of sanctioned entities and individuals. Financial institutions in the US and the EU have 
to verify any transaction with those mentioned in these lists, otherwise they may face civil and 
criminal penalties. 
If MNCs insist on dealing with targets whose governments are deemed as violators of human 
rights, then, they are more likely to face boycotts from their consumers and sizable sanctions 
from senders. In this case, MNCs might prefer to use strategies in their operations with target 
countries that contribute to reduce their visibility to the international public opinion. Among 
these strategies, the following ones can be identified: abiding to international ethical 
standards, use of alternative suppliers from non-sanctioned countries, trading triangulation 
practices, changes in transport practices, exiting their investments in the sanctioned countries, 
use of offshore investment vehicles to avoid sanctions, exploiting loopholes in the enactment 
of those sanctions, lobbying with the sender to be granted sanctions exceptions and use of risk 
financing products to cover losses from political risks. 
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MNCs might abide to international ethical standards conducting their businesses regardless 
their jurisdictions. From this perspective, Kakutami (2017) stresses that the public opinion in 
the sender country as well as in non-sanctioning third countries do not necessarily support 
sanctions imposed by senders on targets. People from the sender country can show 
indifference or consider that these sanctions may be unfair with MNCs engaged with the 
target, minimizing the impact of consumer boycotts that might add to losses imposed by 
senders. By following international ethical standards, MNCs could be well positioned with the 
public opinion to manage their reputational risk for their dealings with sanctions targets. This 
observance is particularly important to EMNCs if they are interested in improving their 
business reputation in developed countries. Among those standards, it is important to consider 
guidelines such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNHR 2011) 
as well as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD 2000). These 
guidelines are mainly aimed at the best practices dealing with potential or already troubled 
countries. MNCs should observe those guidelines whenever these confer superior rights6 than 
those under local laws.  
The use of alternative suppliers from non-sanctioned countries can be an effective   
mechanism for MNCs depending on the characteristics of their required goods or services. 
This practice is advisable for the procurement of non-commodity goods and services whose 
origin can be easily tracked by parties related to the sender. 
On the other hand, the extraterritoriality of many sanctions, like those imposed on Iran by the 
US, might lead to sanctions on suppliers from non-sanctioned countries that already deal with 
                                                          
6 Rights such as child labor, dealings with irregular/armed groups, etc.  
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sanctioned countries. This reach might also affect MNCs that deal with these alternative 
suppliers, demanding a more intensive due diligence on their current or potential suppliers. 
Trading triangulation practices are used to avoid direct linkages with targets. Through those 
practices, MNCs purchase goods or services to a vehicular non-sanctioned party under their 
control that is able to trade with a target. The non-sanctioned party arranges for the delivery of 
those supplies to MNCs operating under the sender’s jurisdictional reach. For goods that are 
considered as commodities it is simpler to avoid any trace to identify their origin as it is 
possible to mix commodities to produce a blended variety that can evade chemical controls, 
such as the coal exports by South African producers under the anti-Apartheid sanctions. A 
solution to mitigate those practices called for the requirement of “mining origin certificates” 
at customs declarations (International Labour Office 1992).The same avoidance can be 
applied in the case of services with a non-tangible nature such as back office support, 
provision of labor force and others, especially if their origin cannot be tracked through 
technological devices, etc.  
There is an intense international campaign to detect these kinds of practices among MNCs. A 
recent example of this practice was evidenced with the Chinese MNC Huawei in 2018, which 
has been accused by US authorities of using non-declared related companies in Hong Kong 
and Mauritius to directly sell goods with US components to Iran and Syria. Those 
components had been banned for sale to Iran and Syria under current US sanctions.7 
In relation to changes in transport practices, some authors (Davarzani, Zanjirani and 
Rahmandad 2015) have found evidence of MNCs constantly changing transport modes and 
                                                          
7 Stecklow, S.; Dehghanpisheh, B. and Pomfret, J. 2019. “Exclusive: New documents link Huawei with suspected 
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routes for their provision of critical items to make more difficult their tracking. Those changes 
are attributed to more intense checking by customs authorities on direct deliveries to or from 
targets. These limitations also involve cargo insurers, which are less willing to cover 
deliveries related to target countries, increasing the insurance costs for these operations as a 
more limited number of insurers will be willing to underwrite these cargoes. 
At the same time, MNCs might consider exiting their investments in target countries to avoid 
sanctions. Their exit can be voluntary or forced under sanctions enactments and should take 
into account their assessment on how long these sanctions are expected to last according to 
the sanctions’ ambitiousness.  
Their exit can comprise the sale of their local operations to domestic or international non-
affected players by these sanctions. Domestic players might be closely related to local elites 
that are supposed to be affected by these sanctions (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 2007). In other 
instances, MNCs can consider the sale of their local operations to their local employees under 
Employee Buyout (EBO) transactions and similar practices involving local parties.  
Another exit mechanism could include the liquidation of different assets corresponding to 
their local operations. However, local governments could ban this exit strategy and 
temporarily occupy local MNCs’ premises in order to avoid any activity that may be regarded 
as deindustrializing. These occupation practices have been evidenced in countries such as 
Venezuela, where the local government under the Chavez and Maduro’s administrations took 
over premises of MNCs such as Kellogg’s, Clorox, etc., to avoid the disposal of their assets 
and their dismantling, which may disrupt their provision of goods to the local market.8 
                                                          
8 BBC. 2018. “Venezuela: Kellogg, fabricante de los corn flakes, cesa sus operaciones en el país tras más de un 
siglo”. BBC, May 16. Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-44134446. 
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In all cases, it is expected that those sales will be closed at undervalued prices. If their new 
owners are related to the ruling elites, then, these elites could procure their acquisition with a 
sanction-rent-seeking goal as they will be facing fewer competitors from abroad operating in 
the local market, making the imposition of sanctions more unlikely to inflict damages on that 
elite.  
Many MNCs could also set offshore investment vehicles outside the jurisdictional reach of the 
sender. These vehicles can act as direct holders of the MNCs’ operations in the target. In this 
way, MNCs procure to avoid direct forced divestments in the target. In addition, the ideal 
jurisdictions for this purpose are those that have entered into Investment Protection Treaties 
with the target’s jurisdiction. In general, these treaties are aimed at procuring investment 
protection guaranties to MNCs from the target’s authorities against risks such as expropriation 
and confiscation under their jurisdiction. 
The protection against forced divestments in targets under economic sanctions should be 
incorporated into these treaties whenever one of their parties acts as a sender imposing 
sanctions on the other party, which may affect operations of MNCs from the sender in the 
target’s jurisdiction. Senders could also include the granting of tax and other incentives to 
their affected MNCs as compensation for their restrictions to deal with sanctioned countries. 
By exploiting loopholes, MNCs also procure to use unclear wordings and waivers in 
economic sanctions to keep dealing with the target.9 Among these common loopholes the 
following ones can be cited: allowances to continue preexisting businesses with the target as 
technical assistance, use of payments mechanisms not considered under sanctions (use of 
                                                          
9 Some loopholes allow foreign MNCs’ subsidiaries to keep dealing with targets. However, under the Iran Threat 
Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (US Congress 2012) US MNCs may become liable if their 
foreign subsidiaries violate US sanctions on those countries. 
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local currencies and cryptocurrencies as described by Abraham 2018), 10 employment of labor 
force from the target countries in non-sanctioned jurisdictions, bartering between countries, 
among others. 11  
In addition to the identification of loopholes, MNCs may also procure sanctions exceptions 
through lobbying practices on the basis of livelihood exceptions, among other considerations. 
These exceptions are granted through the issuance of licenses to follow trading with targets. 
For example, in the case of exceptions granted by the US Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) on US sanctions to different targets such as Cuba, Iran and Sudan, more than 10,000 
licenses to approximately 4,000 US MNCs had been granted under the Bush and Obama 
administrations.12 These licenses allow business dealings with those targets amounting to 
more than USD 1Bn under “humanitarian” exceptions. A closer look at these exceptions by 
Becker (2010) shows deals in different areas from medical and food items to tobacco and 
entertainment. This evidence reveals a high flexibility in the granting of these licenses, mainly 
benefiting MNCs from the sender. 
Further to the previous tactical moves by MNCs, it is important to consider the role of 
political risk insurance to mitigate the loss impact on MNCs from their trade flows and 
investments in target countries. From this perspective, it represents a costlier risk transfer 
mechanism in comparison to Investment Protection Treaties. Among the most active 
                                                          
10 Abraham, Chris. 2018. “Sanctioned Countries looking to cryptocurrencies to bypass embargoes.” 
Newconomy.media, September 9. Accessed March 20, 2020 .https://newconomy.media/news/sanctioned-countries-
looking-to-cryptocurrency-to-bypass-embargoes/.  
11 The use of workers from the target in non-sanctioned jurisdictions, who may be forced to send remittances to the 
target’s authorities such as in the case of North Korean workers working in neighboring countries such as China 
(BBC. 2017.“How does North Korea do business under sanctions?.” Reality Check, BBC. December 29. Accessed 
March 20, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-42314219). 
12 Becker, Jo. 2010. “Licenses granted to US companies run the gamut.” New York Times. December 24. 
Accessed March 20, 2020 https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/12/24/world/24-
sanctions.html?_r=0 
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providers of this type of insurance, the following ones can be cited: MIGA (Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency) of the World Bank Group, ATI (African Trade Insurance 
Agency), the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, ICIEC 
(Islamic Corporation for the Insurance of Investment and Export Credit), Lloyd’s of London 
syndicates, Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) of many countries as well as private insurers such 
as American International Group, Zurich Re, Munich Re, Hannover Re, General  Re, Sompo 
International and Sovereign Risk Insurance, mostly members of The Berne Union, which 
currently reports more than 80 members (The Berne Union 2020). Their typical covers 
comprise risks arising from the host country of insured investments and exports: political 
violence in the host country (terrorism, civil unrest, war and the alike), expropriation and 
confiscation of assets, contract frustration by local governments, wrongful calling of financial 
guarantees, inability to repatriate funds and business Interruption (The Berne Union 2020; 
MIGA 2011). 
The use of this insurance could be useful for MNCs to cover their investments in countries 
that are not included under Investment Protection Treaties. In addition, this insurance could 
provide a safer risk financing mechanism in cases of affected investments in target countries 
whose governments are financially constrained to settle losses arising from political risks 
considered in investment protection treaties. 
However, the current coverage offerings for MNCs’ losses from economic sanctions on target 
countries is very limited by the previously mentioned carriers. Mostly private carriers such as 
Axa (France), Sovereign Risk Insurance (Bermuda) and Sompo (Japan) publicly announce a 
limited and tailor-made cover to protect against financial losses under trade embargoes as at 
the first quarter of 2019 (AXA 2019; Sovereign Risk Insurance 2019; Sompo International 
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2019). ECAs from sender countries are less likely to provide this kind of cover for their 
MNCs as the main backers of these agencies are the senders’ governments imposing these 
sanctions.  
On the other hand, the traditional offering of political risk insurance requires the underwriting 
of these risks before committing any investment or trade transaction. It turns to be difficult to 
obtain this cover for investments already undertaken by MNCs. Under this circumstance, 
MNCs should understand how to assess their expected losses for their dealings with current or 
potential targets after the imposition of economic sanctions This assessment enables them to 
self-insure against the impact of these risks on their preexisting investments and trade 
dealings. 
In addition to the previous difficulties, one of the main critics to the use of insurance is related 
to its likely incidence on a riskier behavior by insureds once covered by an insurance policy. 
From this perspective, it is also important to assess how the availability of political risk 
insurance to cover losses from country economy sanctions might encourage MNCs to engage 
more often in dealings with potential targets. This patterns in plausible considering the 
previous research by Afesorgbor (2019), who evidenced an increase in trade deals with target 
countries in the threat phase. Given this evidence, the imminence of sanctions might 
encourage MNCs to procure insurance coverage against this risk. 
In order to understand the effect of insurance on an MNC’s engagements with a target (prior 
to sanctions) in trade deals, the following game theoretic framework is considered: 
MNC’s behavior without insurance availability: 
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In this case, the MNC have two strategies: engage with a potential target with probability γ 
and not to engage with probability 1- γ. The MNC is assumed as a risk-neutral agent, able to 
diversify its risks across different geographical markets. 
The sender has two choices in this game: impose sanctions with a probability equal to y* (in 
equilibrium as expressed in equation II) and not to impose them with probability 1 – y*. 
The payoff matrix for this game without insurance is represented as follows in Table 4: 
Table 4. Engagement of an MNC with a target country without insurance 






(1- γ)   
Sanctions   
(y*) 
(M-S, -L) (M-S, 0) 
No sanctions  
(1-y*) 
(T, P) (R, 0) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration.  
Where M, T and R are the payoffs to the sender under different scenarios. In the scenario of 
sanctions imposition, the sender faces a cost of S to ensure sanctions compliance. The payoffs 
for the MNC are –L (cost of sales), P (including cost of sales and mark-up), whereas its 
payoff amounts to 0 if not engaged with a target. 
The expected payoff to an MNC engaging without insurance (πEWI) with a target is: 
E(πEWI) = -Ly* + P(1-y*)  (XIII) 
For this game with insurance covering an MNC for its engagements with a target, its 
corresponding payoff matrix is expressed in Table 5: 
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Table 5. Engagement of an insured MNC with a target country  






(1- γ)   
Sanctions   
(y*) 
[M-S, -(y*+e1)L] (M-S, 0) 
No sanctions  
(1-y*) 
[T, P-(y*+e1)L] (R, 0) 
Source: Author’s own elaboration.  
In this case, the MNC pays a premium for (y*+e1)L, where L is the insured amount (cost of 
sales), the term (y*+e1) corresponds to the premium rate considering the optimal sanction 
enforcement probability as in (II) and e1 corresponds to a mispricing factor due to asymmetric 
information between the insurance underwriter and the sender in relation to the probability of 
sanction imposition. The insured MNC might perceive e1 and procure to take advantage of 
this mispricing whenever its expected payoffs with insurance are superior to those without 
insurance.  
The expected payoff to an MNC covered with insurance to engage with a target (πEI) is: 
E(πEI) = -(y*+e1)Ly* + [P-(y*+e1)L](1-y*)   (XIV) 
The MNC will be better-off if its expected payoff with insurance is superior to its payoff 
without insurance, as follows: 
E(πEI) ≥ E(πEWI)      (XV) 
Replacing (XIII) and (XIV) in (XV): 
-(y*+e1)Ly* + [P-(y*+e1)L](1-y*) ≥ -Ly* + P(1-y*) (XVI) 
Expression (XVI) can be rearranged to obtain the range of values for the insurance carrier’s 
mispricing factor, e1: 
e1 ≤  0 
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The mispricing factor most be strictly equal to or lower than 0 for the MNC to be better-off 
with insurance coverage when dealing with target countries before any sanctions imposition. 
The feasibility of this cover requires limiting or suspending its coverage once sanctions are 
imposed on a target, especially if these sanctions have an extraterritorial reach on an MNC 
that might demand this kind of insurance. 
In this case, it has been assumed that the insured is unable to influence the probability of 
sanction imposition by the sender, which is different to other kinds of insurance covers in 
which insureds can influence the loss occurrence probability with their misbehavior after 
obtaining insurance cover (moral hazard). This assumption can be modified whenever an 
MNC can influence the sender’s decision to enforce sanctions on a target without any 
involvement of the insurer, such as forcing a target to introduce changes that might benefit an 
MNC once it has been granted insurance coverage. In this latter scenario, e1 might also reflect 
this effect. 
Further to the use of insurance, it is also important to explore new risk financing mechanisms 
to cover country sanctions-related risks in the alternative risk transfer market through the use 
of capital markets instruments to transfer these risks from MNCs. At the moment, a man-
made risk like terrorism is expected to be traded in capital markets with catastrophe bonds 
and the same kind of instrument could be used to cover other political risks. 13  It could be 
also possible to hedge sanctions-related risks with the Insurance Linked Securities (ILS) by 
making use of generally accepted indexes tracking these risks such as it has been attempted to 
                                                          
13 Terrorism risk is expected to be covered through capital markets with the issuance of CAT bonds by Pool Re, a UK 
government-backed mutual terrorism reinsurance facility (“Pool Re sponsors first terrorism risk catastrophe bond, 
Baltic PCC.” 2019. Artemis.bm, January 14. Accessed March 20, 2020. http://www.artemis.bm/news/pool-re-
sponsors-first-terrorism-risk-catastrophe-bond-baltic-pcc/). 
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cover another man-made risk like cyber risk.14 The development of tracking indexes in the 
political risk area might be possible through the use of modern technologies making use of 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning breakthroughs developed by InsurTech 
companies. One of these companies is GeoQuant, which has developed a software that applies 
these technologies and whose output is an index that reflects political risk levels in real time 
(GeoQuant 2019). The levels of this index could be used as triggers for the payment of 
payouts to the holders of these securities. 
Conclusions and future directions 
From the previous literature review, it is important for MNCs to take into account the 
elements that may lead to the imposition of economic sanctions on each country where they 
plan to start operations or are already operating as well as to assess their impact for potential 
senders and targets under different scenarios by using a game theoretical framework like the 
one proposed by Tsebelis (1990). This framework is suitable to understand the evolving 
pattern of man-made risks, like this political risk, and to assess the optimal sanction 
enforcement probability that influences the expected losses for MNCs whenever they decide 
to avoid further dealings with already sanctioned targets. 
Once MNCs decide to keep dealing with targets (such as in the case of EMNCs and SOEs 
from emerging-market countries) their conspicuity detection (β), according to the previous 
enhancement of the Kakutami’s model, demands their attention to the sustained senders’ track 
record in their sanctioning efforts as well as to MNCs’ management of their reputational risk, 
                                                          
14 PCS has developed a PCS Global Cyber Index that can be used as trigger to  determine payoffs corresponding to 
ILS related to cyber risks ( “PCS aims to help understanding of the silent side of cyber risk: Johansmeyer.” 2018. 
Artemis.bm, September 10. Accessed March 20, 2020. http://www.artemis.bm/news/pcs-aims-to-help-
understanding-of-the-silent-side-of-cyber-risk-johansmeyer/). 
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regardless their optimal sanction-bursting levels. This detection seems to be of less concern 
for many MNCs from developing countries, more prone to employ non-market entry 
strategies into developing countries to reduce their observance to many regulations that, 
otherwise, they must meet in the context of developed countries, as suggested by different 
authors (Garcia-Canal and Guillen 2008; Kobrin 2009; Li and Gaur 2014; Salazar et al. 2018). 
A mismanagement of this risk might also expose MNCs to further losses from consumer 
boycotts. The intensity of these boycotts is expected to be highly related to the values that are 
shared by the public opinion in the sender country as well as in the target country and third 
countries where MNCs operate. A robust way for MNCs to minimize the impact of this risk is 
by conducting their operations in compliance with high corporate and social responsibility 
standards such as the ones suggested under the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights (UNHR 2011) as well as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 
(OECD 2000). 
At the same time, a decrease of the senders’ costs to detect sanctions-bursting activities for 
any level of conspicuity detection should lead MNCs to follow a more sanctions-compliant 
behavior whenever they act as profit maximizers and interested in keeping the possibility to 
deal with senders. Otherwise, MNCs might act pursuing other purposes to keep dealing with a 
growing number of targets, such as geopolitical interests or due to the impossibility to 
compete in markets under the sender’s jurisdictions, as revealed by EMNCs and SOEs from 
emerging market countries. 
Facing the possibility of penalties for their dealings with targets, MNCs should make the 
decision either to keep operations with the target or to assume losses from their temporal or 
permanently exit from these operations or to even transfer those risks to third parties. They 
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can pursue different strategies to retain these risks by reducing the visibility of their direct 
dealings at high reputation risk costs, recurring to lobbying practices to be granted sanctions 
exceptions or transferring those risks to third parties. The transfer of this risk demands 
updates to Investment Protection Treaties to include trade and investment losses due to 
economic sanctions when one of the parties acts as a sender. The use of political risk 
insurance as traditional risk transfer mechanism of political risks also requires its adjustment 
to include MNCs’ losses arising from these sanctions. In addition, the use of capital markets 
to transfer this risk can be also explored by promoting the issuance of instruments such as 
catastrophe bonds and Insurance Linked Securities using triggers related to these risks.  
The feasibility of these instruments should consider the assessment of this risk by exploring 
the different elements that may lead to the imposition of sanctions as discussed in this article. 
Of particular importance is the understanding of the use of insurance as risk financing 
instrument as it could encourage moral hazard in the behavior of insureds (MNCs) whenever 
they have privileged information on the likelihood of sanction impositions by senders in 
comparison to the insurance providers. This risk requires adjustments to the design of 
insurance contracts, such as the use of deductibles, to discourage moral hazard. 
For further research, it is recommended to explore business cases and empirical evidence on 
how the growing presence of EMNCs in many target countries, the increase in the number of 
target countries dealing among them and the use of financial mechanisms outside the 
traditional international financial systems, such as cryptocurrencies, are contributing to reduce 
the effectiveness of the current types of trade and financial sanctions. This comprehension is 
important as senders might react to these trends with countermeasures such as extraterritorial 
sanctions involving all kind of dealings with targets that might affect third parties indirectly 
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related to targets. The reach of these extraterritorial sanctions also demand the use of 
methodologies such as network graphs and others to explore the levels of interconnectedness 
among different business players that might be negatively affected by these sanctions. 
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